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As of 2015, the population of Turkey stood at 78,741,053, of whom 
1,592,437 were, according to Turkish statistics, migrants (born-
abroad).1 If we add to this figure the three million refugees registered 
in the country (of whom about 2.7 million are from Syria), a minimal 
estimate of the share of the foreign-born immigrants in Turkey’s total 
population as of December 2015 would be 5.6 percent.2 Meanwhile, 
Turkey has remained a major migrant-sending country. Turkish-
born migrants residing abroad stood at about 2.9 million in 2014-15, 
of whom 2.5 million were in Europe. Turkish migrants are thus, with 
Moroccans, the largest migrant group in Europe. There are estimated 
to be 5.5 million Turkish citizens living abroad (including second 
and third generations born to Turkish parents outside Turkey), of 
whom around 4.6 million live in Western European countries.3
Since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, migration 
policy has been a tool of nation building and has been aimed at 
establishing a homogeneous Turkish identity.4 Turkification policies 
encouraged the migration of Muslims of Turkish descent and culture 
to Turkey; while non-Muslims, or those perceived as alien to Turkey’s 
Ottoman heritage were considered a threat to Turkish and Muslim 
identity. Turkey’s non-Muslim minority populations have tended to 
emigrate5 and there have also been forced deportations, while, on the 
other hand, some 1.6 million people immigrated to Turkey between 
1923 and 1997. These were Eastern Europeans during the Cold War 
as well as Albanians, Bosnian Muslims, Pomaks (Bulgarian-speaking 
Muslims), and Turks: they came in 1989, 1992-1995, and 1999.6 In 
line with the promotion of a homogeneous Turkic identity, Turkey 
is a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, but holds a clause 
of geographical limitation. It only considers refugees, populations 
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coming from Europe. In the late 1980s, Turkic-
centered immigration patterns began to change. The 
Iran-Iraq war, operations conducted against Kurdish 
populations in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan drove 
increasing numbers of asylum seekers into Turkey. 
Almost half a million mostly Kurdish refugees came 
from Iraq in 1988 and 1991, for instance.7 By the 
early 2000s, Turkey had become a hub for asylum 
seekers, from these and other countries. Owing to 
visa-free bilateral agreements with Middle Eastern 
states such as Iran, Iraq and Syria, as well as with 
neighbouring-ex-Soviet Republics, it also became a 
country of transit towards Europe.8
Emigration trends from Turkey also underwent 
various changes until the 2000s. Turkish emigration 
was first formally organised after the first major 
bilateral labour agreement was signed between 
Turkey and West Germany in 1961.9 The agreement 
opened the first phase of Turkish emigration, 
initially governed by a Gastarbeiter (guest workers)’s 
scheme offering a two-years maximum stay to 
prevent workers’ permanent settlement in Germany. 
Following the 1973 oil-crisis, a second phase 
opened, marked by a shift from labour immigration 
to family reunion across Europe. Some assisted 
return schemes did take place in the mid-1980s, 
but family reunion spurred the progressive de facto 
settlement of Turkish workers across Germany and 
other host states, in Europe and in remoter countries 
such as Australia.10 Migration chains, organised and 
sustained on the basis of a common geographical 
origin, characterised Turks’ migration flows and 
settlement patterns in host states until recently, 
with high geographical concentrations in specific 
neighbourhoods.11 Meanwhile, political instability 
in the 1980s and long-term conflicts, such as the 
conflict between the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) 
and the Turkish state since 1984, encouraged claims 
for asylum abroad.12 In parallel, new migration 
venues opened to Turkish workers in oil-producing 
Arab countries (the Gulf States and Libya), in 
the construction sector and in public works. It is 
estimated for instance, that 500,000 Turks were 
employed in the MENA countries in 1990, on short-
term contracts.13 A third phase in Turkish emigration 
started in 1989-1990, with a renewed hike in family 
reunion initiated by second-generation-descendants 
of Turkish migrants. Transnational marriages, for 
instance, were still common between second- and 
third-generation European nationals of Turkish 
descent and partners from family’s hometowns 
or areas in Turkey. These helped sustaining family 
reunion flows.14 After a diversification of Soviet, and 
later Russian foreign policy, the Turkish government 
shifted from a strong Western-oriented to a more 
multidimensional alliance pattern. New markets 
thus emerged, which attracted numerous Turkish 
labourers and investors, in the former Soviet Union 
countries (the Commonwealth of Independent 
States, CEI).15 
In parallel, policies were put in place that aimed at 
strengthening ties with the members of the Turkish 
transnational diaspora. Evolving from social 
assistance to economic incentives for remittances, 
diaspora policies acquired a political dimension 
in the 1980s and early 1990s, and aimed to secure 
the support of expatriates after the military coup 
in 1980.16 More generally, diaspora policies were 
intended to retain influence over expatriates and 
their organisations, as well as to support “Euro-
Turks”17 demands vis-à-vis the countries of residence 
(especially, in the cultural domain). Incorporation 
in host societies was acknowledged18 and even 
encouraged, yet cultural and political assimilation 
was not. The shaping of a “Muslim national identity” 
in line with Turkey’s foreign policy since the 2000s 
and the coming to power of the AKP extended 
Turkey-Europe diplomatic ties to individual and 
network relationships, which de facto strengthens 
Turkey’s influence in European politics through 
expatriates and their organisations. Turkey’s 
increasingly proactive “diaspora politics” is thus 
driven by economic, political as well as by cultural 
considerations, and is supported by dedicated 
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institutions. Among these there is the Office for Turks 
Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), created 
in 2010 to give an institutional basis to relations to 
Turkish citizens abroad.19 On the politico-cultural 
level, the Yunus Emre Cultural Centres (YEKMs) in 
European cities are said to be important elements 
in Turkey’s foreign cultural policy and for Turkey’s 
“soft power”.20 Additionally, Turkey facilitated the 
mobility of highly-qualified Europeans of Turkish 
descent back to Turkey, as increasing numbers 
of “Euro-Turks” looked for new opportunities in 
Turkey’s booming economy during the 2000s. In 
2012, the YTB established the Blue Card (mavi kart) 
schemes directed at former Turkish citizens having 
lost their citizenship. The document grants them 
extensive rights, such as permanent residency, the 
right to work and the right to purchase real estate, 
without the restrictions that apply to foreigners. 
Turkey’s national identity-based immigration 
policies were further strained by the country’s EU- 
accession process, ongoing since 2004-2005.21 The 
policy harmonization measures, or ‘policy transfer’ 
from the EU to Turkey, triggered a major overhaul 
of Turkey’s legal and institutional framework 
pertaining to migration and asylum. Among these 
changes were: the implementation of the National 
Action Plan on Asylum and Migration after 2005; the 
setting up of the Development and Implementation 
Office on Asylum and Migration Legislation and 
Asylum Capacity under the Ministry of Interior 
in 2008; and the conclusion of readmission 
agreements with several countries.22 Moreover, 
the increasing “securitisation” of migration in the 
2000s23 progressively constructed informality, a 
characteristic of Turkey’s immigration patterns, 
as irregularity. Similarly, the concept of ‘transit’ 
countries became politically constructed to implicitly 
label these as producers of ‘chaotic’ and unmanaged 
movements.24 Turkey had thus to repeal its free visa 
policy with some of its neighbours (Syria, Lebanon, 
Iran, Egypt, etc.) which had caused serious concerns 
in the EU with respect to border management, 
especially since the crisis in Syria.25 The Law on 
Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP), 
ratified in April 2013 and implemented in April 
2014, was a significant step towards managing both 
legal and irregular migration to Turkey, including 
humanitarian migration, which had not previously 
been addressed in Turkish legal provisions.26 A 
Readmission Agreement was also eventually signed 
between the EU and Turkey in December 2013,27 
after a tough negotiation process.28 In parallel, 
an EU–Turkey visa liberalization dialogue was 
initiated, on the basis of the document Roadmap 
Towards A Visa-Free Regime With Turkey.29 Turkey’s 
EU accession process, and eventual visa-free access 
to the Schengen space for Turkish nationals, was 
thus made conditional on Turkey’s management of 
irregular migration to the EU. 
Meanwhile, under the auspices of the Law 
on Foreigners and International Protection, 
migration policy-making became centralized 
within a newly created General Directorate for 
Migration Management (GDMM). The GDMM’s 
responsibilities include: developing new legislation 
and strategies; coordinating and managing 
multiagency efforts to combat irregular migration; 
standardizing practices; registering and determining 
status of potential refugees; and ensuring protection 
for victims of human trafficking, stateless persons, 
and those who receive temporary protection.30 
The Syria crisis eventually forced an estimated 2.7 
million refugees into Turkey. Relying on its new 
tools and policy measures but still applying its 
geographical limitation, Turkey implemented a 
temporary protection regime, as per Article 91 of the 
Law on Foreigners and International Protection.31 
The regime is based on three principles: an open 
border policy; the principle of non-refoulement; and 
registration with the Turkish authorities and support 
inside the precincts of the camps.32 The registration 
of the refugees is performed by GDMM, while AFAD 
(the Turkish Disaster and Emergency Management 
Presidency) set up the refugee camps and manages 
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them. Since 2011, the Turkish government has 
provided aid to Syrian refugees costing some 0.8% 
of 2014 GDP.33 These in return boosted the country’s 
economy.34 In theory, Syrian refugees living inside or 
outside the camps, are also entitled to rights within 
the temporary protection regulation, such as access 
to health care, education, social assistance and access 
to the labour market. While the first two started being 
implemented,35 the possibility for Syrians to apply 
for work permits was only given in January 2016. 
It is limited to those legally registered and having 
resided in the country for six months, and capped 
at 10 percent of a firm’s workforce. The move was 
justified as a way to stop the informal employment 
of refugees, accused of dragging wages down.36 Yet, 
to date, only about 8,000 permits have been issued 
to Syrian refugees. President Erdogan proposed 
to grant Turkish citizenship to 300,000 skilled and 
highly-skilled Syrian refugees in July 2016.37 This 
proved controversial as it was seen as a way for the 
leader to gain more political leverage, inside, as well 
as outside Turkey. Most interpretations, indeed, 
linked the move to an attempt at instrumentalising 
refugees to bargain with the EU.38 
Turkey’s role in managing refugee does give the 
country bargaining power against the EU. Following 
massive flows of refugees to the EU in Summer 
2015, the European Union and Turkey signed an 
agreement, 29 November 2015, under which the EU 
promised Turkey €3 billion to manage the refugee 
crisis in the country, and prevent Syrian and Iraqi 
refugees from reaching EU countries. However, slow 
progress in implementing the Agreement prompted 
another EU-Turkey summit in March 2016. The 
new agreement allows all new irregular migrants 
arriving after March 20 to Greece to be returned 
to Turkey. In exchange, EU Member States will: 
increase the resettlement of Syrian refugees residing 
in Turkey (one for each returned irregular migrant); 
accelerate visa liberalisation for Turkish nationals; 
and boost existing financial support for Turkey’s 
refugee population.39 As of early November 2016, 
the European Commission stated that only 721 
refugees had been returned to Turkey, of the 20,000 
persons who arrived in Greece since April 2016.40 
Meanwhile, the postponement of the visa-free 
agreement prompted Turkey to consider submitting 
its accession process to a popular referendum in 
2017.41
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OUTWARD MIGRATION
Stock
In 2014, an estimated 2.9 million Turkish migrants, 
(i.e., first-generation, born in Turkey) were residing 
abroad, that is 3.6 percent of the total population of 
the country. The vast majority were in Europe (86 
percent), Germany alone hosted 47 percent of these 
migrants. The second largest community of Turkish 
migrants was in France, where a modest 9 percent of 
all Turkish expatriates lived.
As for the 4.6 million holders of Turkish citizenship 
recorded by Turkish consular services (first 
generation migrants, and born-abroad second and 
third generations together), 461,407 of them were 
naturalized in their European host countries between 
2005 and 2014. Yet, German statistics indicated that 
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Stock74 
As of 2015, Turkish statistics counted 1,592,437 
migrants (born-abroad) in the country. Another 3 
million refugees, mostly Syrians, were to be added to 
the figure. All in all, about 5.6 percent of those residing 
in Turkey were migrants. This was a marked increase 
from the 1,278,671 foreign-born residents in the 
country recorded during the 2000 census, who made 
up 1.9 percent of Turkey’s total population.
 
In 2000 (Table 2), there were 1,278,671 foreign-born 
persons in Turkey, most of whom had been born in 
Bulgaria (38 percent), as well as in Greece and other 
European countries. These were probably ethnic Turks, 
members of Muslim minorities expelled since the fall 
of the Soviet bloc from their countries of origin in the 
Balkans (see introduction). Others, meanwhile, were 
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only 47 percent of the 2,851,000 residents of Turkish 
migrant background,42 held German nationality as 
of 31 December 2015.43 Among the first-generation 
migrants, the share was even lower, at 22 percent 
(of the 1,364,000 Turkish migrants, 1,065,644 were 
Turkish nationals only). Holders of double nationality 
(German and Turkish) numbered 246,000.44  In Austria 
where about 260,000 first- and second-generation 
Turkish migrants and their children resided as of 2011, 
about 60 percent held Austrian citizenship.45 
As well as the large numbers in Europe, smaller 
communities of Turk migrants formed in North 
America, as well as in the CIS countries. Most of those 
in the CIS are short-term (six months to two years), 
project-tied contract expatriates employed in Turkish 
multinational companies, who left their families 
behind in Turkey. Yet some are also professionals and 
investors who took up opportunities in the region, and 
set up small- and middle-sized businesses in all sorts 
of sectors.46   
 
In Western (OECD) countries, Turkish migrants show 
a relatively balanced sex ratio on average: 52 percent 
of them are males. Half of them (48 percent) are in 
working age-groups (25-44 years old) and 10 percent 
are aged 65 and more. Turkish migrant populations 
are also characterized by a relatively homogeneous age 
Europe-born “returnees” of Turkish descent. The trend 
remained over the years. Most foreign-born residents 
in 2015 were from Europe (60 percent), Bulgaria 
being still the most common place of birth for those 
born abroad (24 percent), followed by Germany (17 
percent). The decrease in the number of residents born 
in Bulgaria (a “loss” of over 100,000 between 2000 and 
2015) as well as in other Balkan States, confirms that 
these are now aging and that “ethnic” migrant flows 
are now over. As for the slight decrease in the numbers 
of those born in Germany recorded between the two 
dates (-10,200), it seems contradictory with the hike in 
the number of “Euro-Turks” emphasized in scholarly 
and press accounts since the early 2000s. This gap may 
be due to the growing circularity of migration between 
the two countries, highlighted earlier in this paper. 
The change in the population recording method from 
census-taking to administrative registry, may also lead 
to those residing under a tourist visa being missed out, 
as well as some dual nationals.75 The numbers indeed 
went up, of those born in other countries hosting 
sizeable communities of Turkish migrants and the 
second-generation (France, the Netherlands, Austria). 
This supports the hypothesis of a growing presence 
of “Euro-Turks” in Turkey, yet a population that has 
remained relatively limited in size. 
The original characteristic of the foreign born 
population in Turkey is, indeed, that it is mostly 
composed of Turkish nationals (dual nationals or 
Turks only). In 2014, the Population Register statistics 
recorded 992,597 Turkish citizens born abroad, or 1.3 
percent of the Turkish population.76 This would signify 
that born-abroad non-nationals (foreign immigrants) 
would number around 600,000 (total figure of the 
born-abroad in 2015-Turkish nationals born abroad 
in 2014). Some are German of Turkish descent who 
renounced their Turkish nationality and reside under 
the “blue card” (mavi kart) scheme. Indeed, the non-
Europeans recorded in 2015 numbered 638,600. Those 
born in Arab countries stood at 232,300, making up 
15 percent of the born abroad. Iraq and Syria ranked 
first among those origin countries, at respectively 
97,500 and 78,000. The figure for Syria-born confirms 
that refugees are not incorporated in the figures (see 
below). The CEI was the third largest group of foreign 
birth places, with Azeri, as well as Uzbeks and Russians 
ranking first. Their numbers had increased notably 
since 2000; those originating from Azerbaijan even 
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trebled in number in just two years. As for those born 
in Asia (10 percent of all foreign born), they mainly 
originate from Afghanistan, Georgia and Iran. Those 
from Iran’s numbers also trebled over the fifteen years 
to reach 36,000 in 2015 (Table 2). 
It is interesting to note that females outnumber males 
among those born abroad, by some 117,000 individuals. 
The gender imbalance is particularly marked for those 
born in the CIS region, among whom 65 percent are 
women. Many Russians are married to Turkish men 
and reside in Turkey.77 However, the predominance of 
females among other Caucasian, Central Asian and 
South-Western European groups of origin may signal 
that these nationals are often employed in child care 
and domestic services.78
The number of residence permits (including renewals) 
granted to non-nationals by the Ministry of Interior 
in 2015 totaled 422,895.79 Almost a half were short-
term permits (202,403).80 Family reunion was the 
major grounds for delivering a permit (73,705), closely 
followed by “student” and “work-related” permits 
(67,529 and 62,756 delivered documents).
 
Iraqis and Syrians were granted the largest number of 
residencies (respectively 33,202 and 32,578), but these 
were mostly short-term ones (respectively 76 and 62 
percent). With 22,584 residencies, Azeris dominated 
among the holders of longer-term residence permits 
(from above one year to unlimited stay, according to 
structure, as pointed out in Figure 1. It is everywhere 
strongly skewed towards active age groups. Children 
(0-14 years) and older age groups (55 and beyond) are 
very few in every host country.
In Canada, in the US and in Australia, 11 to 13 
percent of migrants are aged 65 and more. This is 
in line with the old migration trends linking Turkey 
and these countries. Yet, distance to Turkey may have 
deterred former migrants from returning after retiring 
from work. These countries also host young families 
from Turkey. In Canada, for instance, 7 percent of 
Turkish migrants are children younger than fifteen. 
In these countries, migrants’ age distribution is more 
balanced than in Europe, but males are also slightly 
overrepresented (55 percent of all migrants).
Migrants from Turkey in these regions, as in the UK, are 
also typically highly educated (Figure 2).47  In Britain, 
education is indeed the prime purpose of residence for 
Turks: 35 percent of them hold an education-related 
permit.48 This is consistent with their age distribution: 
those in the 25-34 age group make up one-third of the 
total.  
The socio-demographic profile of migrants from 
Turkey stands, in the rest of Europe, in marked contrast 
with North America’s young professionals’ families 
and Britain’s highly-educated scholars. Students make 
up a quarter of Turkish residents in the EU;49 yet most 
Turkish migrants there are in active age groups (25-
44 years especially); older migrants make up only 
3 to 6 percent of the total (Germany standing as an 
exception with 12 percent aged 65 and above). This 
confirms how Turkish migrants tend to leave Europe 
upon retirement, as has been noted by researchers.50 
Children (0-14 years) are also typically much less well 
represented there than in North America. In Germany, 
they make up only 1 percent of the total. Such an age-
structure, added to the relative gender balance (52 to 
55 percent males in total), suggests the prevalence of 
family reunion for marriage purposes as a path to the 
immigration from Turkey to Europe, prior to family 
formation and birth of children there. In effect, in 2015 
the majority of recent Turkish residents (first permit 
holders), males and females alike,51 lived in Europe 
under family reunion schemes (up to 85 percent of all 
first permits in Germany for instance), with marriage 
ranking first as a purpose for family reunion (49 percent 
in Germany; 62 percent in France). By comparison, 
only a few Turkish migrants in Europe were benefiters 
of humanitarian migration schemes that year (3 
percent of first permits in the EU as a whole; 7 percent 
in France and 6 percent in Germany), or resided for 
the explicit purpose of labour. Interestingly, these kind 
of labour migrants are most common in Sweden where 
they make up 22 percent of first permit holders. 
 
As regards education, Turkish migrants stand out 
among migrant populations, as they are less educated 
on average than non-migrants.52 Figure 2 indicates 
that 16 percent of Turkish migrants in the 25-34 age 
group are highly-educated, whereas 19 percent of the 
same age group are highly-educated in Turkey (non-
migrants). In Europe especially (with the exception of 
Britain as indicated earlier, and of Sweden), university 
graduates make up only 4 to 11 percent of all migrants 
from Turkey. 
As might have been expected, Turks in Canada 
and Britain perform highly-skilled professions in 
general: the three top categories of professions (the 
“managers”, “professionals” and “technicians and 
associate professionals”) employed respectively 49 and 
35 percent of them.53 By contrast, in Germany and 
in Austria, three-quarters of migrants from Turkey 
were in the three lowest-skilled categories.54 Most 
the type of permit)81 (Figure 6). Their main purpose 
for staying in Turkey was education (46 percent of the 
22,584 permits issued), as it was for the Turkmens (53 
percent of the residencies granted to these nationals). 
The statistics of the Turkish Council of Higher 
Education indicated that numbers of international 
tertiary students in the country had been rising to 
reach a total of 48,200 in 2013-2014. The top-five 
origin countries of students were Azerbaijan and 
Turkmenistan, followed by Iran, Afghanistan and 
Syria.82 Other nationalities displayed different profiles, 
as indicated in Figure 6: Russians were mainly residing 
in Turkey for family reunion, while Georgians and 
Ukrainians, for instance, were mostly workers (77 
percent of residencies granted to Georgians, for 
instance). Georgians were by far the first recipients 
of permits for work reasons in 2015 (9,398) and 
Ukrainians ranked second with 4,838 such permits. 
In 2013 (last available data), most work permits had 
been granted for “domestic work” (14,931 out of 
45,836), then for “hospitality” (6,243 permits) and 
for “performing arts and entertainment”. The three 
categories together made up 51 percent of all labour 
permits granted,83 which can explain the high share of 
women migrants seen in Table 2.
Refugees in Turkey are not included in the figures of 
residence permits holders,84 nor are they recorded in 
the ABPRS. As of September 2016, registered refugees 
numbered above 3 million, of whom 2.7 million were 
from Syria (Table 3).85 The second and third largest 
nationalities were Iraqis and Afghans (126,000 and 
114,000 respectively). According to UNHCR’s records, 
half of the refugees and asylum-seekers of these two 
national groups were adult males, while adult females 
went to make up about 20 percent. Children made up 
around 30 percent of all Iraqi and Afghan registered 
persons, which suggest a sizeable share of families 
among these populations.86
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(34 percent in the two countries) were in “elementary 
occupations”. In France, the Netherlands and Sweden, 
the occupational distribution is still more diverse, 
with a predominance of “blue collar” occupations: in 
France, 40 percent were in “Craft and related trades”. 
Only 18 to 27 percent (in respectively, France and in 
the Netherlands) were in the top three categories. In 
Europe, Turkish migrants also often work in “services 
and trade”-related professions. The numbers ranged 
from 10 (France) to 30 percent (Sweden) of employed 
migrants.55
This clustering of Turkish migrant populations56  in 
low education and low-skilled professions in Europe, 
and especially in Germany and Austria, raises 
questions. A first line of explanation may reside in 
the patterns of migration from Turkey to Europe. We 
have seen that migration networks and chains linking 
expatriate communities in Europe with their region, 
village or neighbourhood of origin in Turkey were still 
important, for marriage purposes, for instance. The 
first migrants who went to Europe in the 1960s were 
most often from rural regions; their education and 
skill levels were low. It is, therefore, a possibility that 
traditional migration networks continue attracting 
low-educated young males and females to Europe from 
these regions, which in some cases remain deprived.
The clustering of Turkish migrants in low levels of 
education and low-skilled professions may also be 
due to discriminations against these populations, 
partly the result of host countries’ policies.57  Germany 
and Austria, for instance, did not, until very recently, 
perceive themselves as immigration countries. 
Therefore, no policies were put in place to promote 
young migrants’ integration in these major host 
countries. Migrants are considered culturally distinct 
even after years of residence.58  
Flows
In general, Turkish net migration flows to Europe have 
been sharply decreasing since the early 2000s in every 
European country. The average downwards trends 
follow context and policy changes in host countries, 
especially regarding conditions for naturalisations,59 
family reunion and for the granting of asylum. The 
management of successive EU enlargement steps 
had already been feeding populist/protectionist 
Those aged younger than eighteen made up a higher 
share of Syrian refugees (47 percent), while older 
Syrians (aged 65 and above) composed 19 percent of 
the total. The overall population displayed a balanced 
sex ratio with 53 percent males. The overwhelming 
majority of Syrians lived in urban communities: only 9 
percent were hosted in camps. Half of the 2.7 million 
registered Syrian refugees were living in Istanbul 
(an estimated 400,000), and in the governorates of 
Sanliurfa, Hatay and Gaziantep along the Syrian 
border.87 The refugee camps are located in this region. 
Flows
As opposed to their emigration flows which have 
decreased since the early 2000s, all categories of 
migrants’ flows to Turkey have gone up in recent years. 
Turkey is thus becoming, more than ever, a country of 
immigration.
This is first illustrated by the entries and exits statistics 
(Fig. 6): these indicate that overall levels of net 
migration are rising, after a drastic fall at the end of 
the 2000s, most likely an effect of the global financial 
crisis. Since then, however, net migration from the 
EU-28 ceased being largely positive. The largest net 
flows started originating from CIS countries and from 
West Asia (Arab Middle Eastern countries and Iran) 
in the mid-2000s. Small numbers of South-East Asians 
and Africans are also to be seen in the country.
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discourses60 against non-European populations. Yet, 
the events of 9/11 spurred suspicion towards Muslim 
populations (including Turkish migrant communities), 
hence enhancing the ‘securitization’ of the migration 
issue over the 2000s.
 
Turkish migration trends to Germany illustrate this. 
From a high of 48,500 net movements in 1989 (with 
85,700 entries), the net migration flows became 
negative in 2006; exits have been outnumbering entries 
since then.
This is due to policy changes in the country, which 
limited avenues for Turkish immigration to Germany, 
and shifted their patterns of entry to the country. 
Figure 3 indicates a first decrease of net migration flows 
during the 1990s; Figure 4 suggests that this may be due 
to a fall in the numbers of visas61 granted for asylum-
seeking purposes. Turks who applied for asylum in 
Germany were 25,514 in 1995, 8,968 in 2000, and only 
1,365 in 2014. This fall happened after the mid-1990s 
when a change in the German Constitution in 1993 
limited the right of asylum to applicants who had not 
previously transited through other safe countries on 
their way to Europe.62 
 
Residence permits issued also increased from a low 
of 163,326 in 2009. In addition, some shifts occurred 
in their characteristics: while family reunion and 
education remained the principal grounds for 
delivering residency, the “work” reason hiked in 2015 
at 63,000, from a low of 18,500 permits in this category 
in 2014 (44,300 in 2013).88 The share of first permits 
among all permits delivered also went up, from 10 to 
23 percent of all granted permits (2008-2012),89 which 
is in line with the recent shifts in migration patterns 
and policies in Turkey 
Recent years saw a change in the origin countries of 
foreigners receiving residence permits. In 2012 the top 
five were Georgia, the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan, 
Bulgaria and Germany. In 2014, there was a significant 
increase in the number of residence permits issued to 
Iraqis (38,700), Syrians (31,800), Afghans (29,800), 
Azerbaijanis (27,000) and Iranians (18,900).90 As 
noted above, in 2015 Iraqis, Syrians and Azerbaijanis 
ranked first among all recipients with almost 100,000 
permits together. Georgians, Russians and Iranians 
still stood among the top-ten receivers of permits in 
Turkey, however, together with Chinese and other 
Central Asian nationalities. 
Inflows to Turkey are shaped by several factors, which 
help explain the changing nature of inflows over the 
last decade. First, the country recovered quickly from 
10 ■  Migration Policy Centre | December 2016
A second major step in Turkish immigration to 
Germany is the drastic fall in the number of visas 
granted for family-related purposes throughout the 
2000s, from 23,663 in 2000 to 7,870 in 2010 (Figure 4). 
A third element of importance in the decreasing net 
migration flows from Turkey to Germany (and to 
Europe in general) is the rise in exits observed in the 
late 2000s. This was due, in first place, to the expansion 
of the retirees age groups. Second, Turkey had become 
an attractive economy in the 2000s, as signalled by its 
high GDP.63 The socio-economic reforms undertaken 
in the context of its EU-accession process also closed 
parts of the socio-cultural gap previously alienating 
Europe-born second-generations from their parents 
country. Added to this, the recognition of qualifications 
acquired in Germany, increased prospects for attractive 
jobs and faster promotion. This was especially true for 
young females since more women are found presently 
in management positions in Turkey than in Germany, 
and, above all, “emotional reasons”,64 may all explain 
the movement of “return” to the country, of some 
second-and third-generation European nationals of 
Turkish descent. Unfortunately, available statistics do 
not allow us to measure the volume of such flows.
the financial crisis and its economy remained attractive 
to foreign labourers. Georgians, Ukrainians as well as 
CIS nationals have been dominating the (legal) labour 
market. Syrians have been added to these since 2015. 
Second, the number of foreign students enrolled in 
Turkish universities has doubled since 2005, from 
15,481 to 31,170.91 This is because of the alignment 
of Turkey’s education system to world standards, 
the development of English as a teaching language 
in many universities and the incorporation of the 
country into international students’ exchange schemes 
(ERASMUS especially). Moreover, education being 
a tool in foreign relations, Turkey’s proactive foreign 
policy and cultural diplomacy prompted the country 
to attract foreign students from Turkish-speaking 
countries, (some of the CIS countries for instance) and 
from the area of Turkic cultural influence, as well as 
from other developing areas (Sub-Saharan Africa for 
instance). The religious affinity factor, especially since 
the coming to power of President Erdogan, may also 
act as an incentive for students from Muslim countries 
to come to Turkey. 
 
Third, the many protracted conflicts affecting the 
Central Asian and Middle Eastern regions had a 
profound effect on the characteristics and patterns of 
immigration to Turkey. Entries of asylum-seekers to 
Turkey were very few in 2004 (3,926), but then soared 
to reach 87,800 in 2014 (Figure 7). Iranians made up 
11 ■  Turkey  
Despite the overall decrease in inflows, family reunion 
is still by far the prime route for Turkish immigration 
to Germany (and, as seen earlier, to the rest of 
Europe). It is worth saying though that visas granted 
for education purposes have gained in numbers and 
in relative share since 2000.65 Marriage makes up the 
bulk of family-related visas (79 percent) as of 2014. 
Interestingly, a slight majority (52 percent) of the visas 
granted for marriage purposes that year were for a 
marriage with a non-German. Most marriages took 
place with a foreign male residing in Germany (39 
percent of all marriages), and second with a German 
female (28 percent). Besides indicating the persistence 
of transnational marriages between Turkey and 
Europe, this also suggests that naturalisation may not 
be the prime aim underlying marriage with a resident 
of Germany, national or otherwise. 
As a matter of fact, naturalisations of Turkish citizens 
in Germany have been gone down notably since 
a high of 100,384 naturalisations in 1999, down 
to 19,695 citizenship acquisitions in 2015. Rates 
of naturalisation66  of Turkish citizens in Germany 
are also very low (the lowest in Europe), and have 
decreased since 2000, from 4.7 percent to 1.3 percent. 
By comparison (Figure 5), rates of naturalisation in 
other countries reached much higher levels at times 
such as in Sweden in the mid-2000s (26 percent in 
2006). However, it should be noted that today, rates 
have become very low everywhere, even in the UK and 
in Sweden.
  
half of those in 2004, and their numbers multiplied by 
four over the subsequent ten years. Afghans applying 
for asylum in Turkey also increased, from 300 to above 
15,000 and the number of Iraqis jumped from 950 to 
50,000. Iraqis made up almost 60 percent of all asylum 
applications in 2014. The continuous instability and 
conflicts plaguing the country since 1991 worsened 
in the mid-2000s and shows no signs of improvement 
with the war against Da’esh. 
Syrian refugees are registered upon arrival under the 
temporary protection regime provided by the Turkish 
authorities. The outflows of Syrians fleeing the conflict 
started in 2011, but remained moderate and circular. 
Many refugees continued to be unregistered. A failed 
ceasefire attempt in May 2012, ongoing fighting in 
Northern Syria and occupation of large territories 
in that country by Da’esh after 2014 prompted rising 
numbers of refugees to flee to Turkey, from 20,000 
every month in 201292  to above 50,000 by late 2014.93   
 
A hike in the number of registered persons is particularly 
noticeable between October and December 2014 
(Figure 8), when the one million refugees -threshold 
was reached. This period witnessed intense battles 
between Da’esh and local and international fighters, 
in Kobane on the Turkish border, and in the Raqqa 
region. This, of course, spurred massive displacements. 
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Does this mean that Turks do not seek naturalisation 
in Europe anymore? On the one hand the recent 
trends of “return” to Turkey signal the growing 
transnationalisation of European communities of 
Turkish descent. Moreover, being naturalized in the 
host country proved not to be an obstacle to such 
moves.67 Some authors, therefore, contend that this 
context, added to the easing of residence conditions 
in Germany, spurred a change in Turkish migration 
patterns, with more temporary migration and 
circularity between the two countries.68 
On the other hand, however, the convergence of all 
countries towards very low naturalization rates of 
Turkish migrants suggest a policy issue. Effectively, the 
generalization throughout the 2000s of “citizenship 
tests” as a prerequisite to naturalization, which assess 
applicants’ language command and knowledge of 
social and political institutions in the host country, has 
lowered the naturalization rates of Turkish migrants. 
This is mostly because of their low levels of education, 
outside the host countries’ systems.69 These tests 
may also be deterring many Turkish migrants from 
applying, unless they are educated.70 Circularity may 
thus not be a choice for most, but be imposed by 
the toughening of citizenship and immigration laws 
throughout Europe, targeted at low-skilled expatriates. 
Turkish emigration patterns are, indeed, changing and 
migrants are facing new difficulties. During the 2000s, 
the numbers of contract labourers sent abroad by the 
Turkish Employment Agency (TEA) went up and 
reached a peak of 81,309 in 2006, a level comparable to 
those found in 1971-1972.71 In 2012, those employed 
abroad in such schemes stood at 67,045, mostly in the 
Middle East (40,158), followed by the CIS (17,448) 
and European Union countries (1,377).72 In 2014, 
however, and perhaps due to the degradation of the 
security situation in the Middle East, the Agency sent 
only 39,000 expatriate contract labourers. A quarter 
of these were in the Russian Federation (23 percent), 
in Iraq (19 percent), in Saudi Arabia (9.5 percent), in 
Turkmenistan and in Azerbaijan (9 and 6 percent).73   
Considering that Turkey closed off large sections of 
its border with Syria in 2015, the other jump in the 
number of registered refugees as of November 2015 
may be an adjustment of the refugees’ figures. This 
followed on from a campaign of biometric registration 
of camp and non-camp Syrian refugees in Turkey 
was conducted under the supervision of the DGMM. 
By the end of December, 2,503,549 Syrians were 
said to have been biometrically registered in Turkey, 
representing an increase of 211,649 from November.94 
Most refugees in Turkey come from the Aleppo and 
Idleb regions, as well as from Raqqa, Lattakia, Hama 
and Hassake. Initially, all were accommodated in 
AFAD-run camps. Yet, as numbers were soaring, 
camps could not absorb the inflows and most refugees 
are now settled in urban communities. This is why 
the monitoring of refugees’ numbers is problematic. 
Questions emerged95 regarding the accuracy of the 
registration figures, especially since mid-2015 and 
the mass migration wave to Europe from or through 
Turkey.96 Some returns are also said to have occurred 
since some border areas were recently liberated by 
rebel forces.97 Yet, figures of refugees’ registration have 
continued growing, while, at the same time, entries of 
Syrians into Turkey has become increasingly difficult 
due to the sealing of the border.98 
Nevertheless, the economic, cultural and geographic 
attractiveness of Turkey, its proximity to Europe 
all make it a hub for irregular migrants from 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, CIS 
and other countries. Estimates of their numbers 
reached one million in early 2010, which cannot 
be assessed. GDMM statistics indicate that 146,485 
migrants deemed “irregular” were arrested in 2015, 
which signifies that more were living in Turkey at the 
time. Syrians made up half of those arrested (73,422), 
followed by Afghans (35,921). In 2014, 59,000 had 
been apprehended. The figures merely indicate that 
Turkey may have started complying with EU demands 
to control migrants’ movements in 2015.
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97.  http://syrianobserver.com/EN/News/31858.
98. Forcible returns also took place: see Amnesty International. Turkey: Illegal mass returns of Syrian refugees expose 
fatal flaws in EU-Turkey deal, Amnesty International, 2016. https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2016/04/
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